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Abstract 
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in many countries mainly through the tax code. The 
adverse effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on economic efficiency 
and growth are large and well documented in the economics literature. The main argument in 
favor of subsidizing owner-occupied housing is that it creates positive externalities that offset 
these adverse effects. This paper tests whether homeowners create positive externalities to 
their immediate neighborhood that capitalize into housing prices in multi-storey buildings. 
Using semiparametric hedonic regressions with and without instrumental variables we find 
no evidence of positive externalities from neighborhood homeownership rate. This result is 
robust to relaxing the identification assumptions of our instrument using a recently developed 
set identification method. Our results suggest that the adverse efficiency effects of lenient tax 
treatment of owner-occupied housing are not offset by positive externalities. 
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1   Introduction 
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in many western countries. In most cases, the 
subsidy is channeled through the tax code by excluding imputed rental income and 
capital gains from homeowners’ taxable income while allowing them to deduct 
mortgage interest payments (Hendershott and White, 2000; Englund, 2003). The 
adverse effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on economic 
efficiency and growth are well documented in the economics literature.1 
Furthermore, it has been reported that the tax benefits are regressive and benefit 
mostly middle- and high-income households (Hills, 1991; Poterba, 1992; Poterba and 
Sinai, 2008; Saarimaa, 2011). Given these facts, the main argument in favor of 
subsidizing homeownership has to be that it creates positive externalities or social 
benefits.  
The case for positive externalities from homeownership is based on the 
hypothesis that homeowners put more weight on the condition and amenity levels of 
their neighborhood than renters. This is because in most cases a house is the single 
most important asset in a homeowner’s wealth portfolio, and thus, a homeowner’s 
wealth level depends on the quality of their immediate neighborhood. This should 
create incentives for homeowners to engage in activities that improve neighborhood 
quality. If homeowners’ actions improve neighborhood quality, neighborhoods with 
high homeownership rates are more desirable for prospective buyers and higher 
neighborhood quality translates into higher housing prices.2  
                                                 
1 These include inefficient allocation of the capital stock (Berkovec and Fullerton, 1992; Skinner, 
1996; Gervais, 2002), suboptimal household wealth portfolios (Brueckner, 1997; Flavin and 
Yamashita, 2002; Chetty and Szeidl 2012) and frictions in the labor market (Oswald, 1999; Coulson 
and Fisher, 2009; Head and Lloyd-Ellis, 2012). 
2 It is somewhat unclear whether all homeowners’ actions create external benefits in a broader sense. 
Homeowners may, for example, oppose the building of social housing in their neighborhoods, and 
thus, only shift the possible harm to other neighborhoods and households. Nevertheless, these 
activities should raise house prices in the neighborhood. 
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DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Hoff and Sen (2005) present formal models 
where homeowners are able to reap the benefits from their investment in 
neighborhood amenities (broadly speaking) even if they move away from the 
neighborhood. This happens because improved neighborhood quality gets capitalized 
into house values. Renters, on the other hand, are unable to capitalize on their 
investment to the same extent, because their housing costs increase and landlords 
capture the increased return on housing capital. Moreover, ex ante contracting for 
these contingencies is very difficult. In fact, if rents rise sufficiently improvements in 
neighborhood quality may even result in a welfare loss for some renters. 
Empirical research on the effects of homeownership is growing, but the results 
so far are mixed. A typical empirical strategy has been to look at the effects of 
homeownership on individual outcomes and behavior, such as voting, civic 
participation or child achievement. The results from this literature remain 
inconclusive because of major endogeneity issues in estimation. For example, 
Dipasquale and Glaeser (1999) find that homeowners are more politically involved. 
Green and White (1997), Boehm and Schlottmann (1999), Aaronson (2000) and 
Haurin et al. (2002) find that homeownership is associated with improved child 
outcomes. Hilber (2010) finds evidence that homeowners are more likely to engage in 
creating and maintaining neighborhood specific social capital especially in areas with 
inelastic housing supply where social capital is likely to capitalize into housing 
prices. 
However, some recent studies seem to indicate that some if not all of the 
positive effects of homeownership found in the earlier literature are driven by 
inadequate control of unobservable factors that are correlated with homeownership. 
For example, Barker and Miller (2009) argue that the beneficial effects of 
homeownership on several measures of child welfare are overestimated in earlier 
literature. Similarly, using an exogenous social experiment as their identifying 
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assumption, Engelhardt et al. (2010) find that homeownership has no effect on 
political involvement of low-income households.  
In this paper, instead of looking at the effects of homeownership on outcomes 
or behavior of individuals, we simply ask: are houses more valuable in neighborhoods 
with higher homeownership rates. If homeowners’ investments increase neighborhood 
quality, they should be reflected in housing prices.3 Our strategy is to estimate a 
hedonic house price model where neighborhood homeownership rate is included as an 
explanatory variable. Coulson et al. (2003) and Coulson and Li (2011) use this 
strategy and find a positive association between neighborhood homeownership rate 
and prices of single-family homes. Both papers use data from the American Housing 
Survey. A clear problem in using survey data with a hedonic model is that house 
prices are not from actual transactions but estimated by the owners in the survey. 
Banzlaf and Farooque (2012) show that although self-reported house values are 
correlated with transaction prices, they do not reflect local public goods as well as 
transaction prices. Furthermore, the analyses in Coulson et al. (2003) and Coulson 
and Li (2011) are limited to neighborhoods composed of single-family homes. It is 
not clear whether their results extend to other housing structures or neighborhoods 
consisting of other than single-family homes. 
Our analysis differs from and complements previous studies in a number of 
ways. First, we use geo-referenced house transaction data which facilitates the use of 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and more precise measurement of 
neighborhood attributes. Second, precise geo-referencing together with 
semiparametric econometric techniques allow us to control for unobserved 
neighborhood attributes that do not vary within a relatively small neighborhood.4 
Third, we concentrate on housing units in multi-storey apartment buildings, which 
                                                 
3 Recently Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) and Autor et al. (2011) have found that residential 
investments have significant price spillover effects on neighboring houses.  
4 For recent examples of these methods in hedonic models, see McMillen (2010) and McMillen and 
Redfearn (2010).  
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are the prevailing housing structure in urban areas. The problem in using data from 
neighborhoods with single-family houses is that, at least in our application of 
Finnish data, they are almost exclusively owner-occupied. This makes it difficult to 
separate the neighborhood effects of homeownership from amenities offered by a 
neighborhood consisting of single-family houses, such as housing structure, open 
space, gardens and so forth. Concentrating on apartment buildings in a built-up 
urban area also means that housing supply is relatively inelastic facilitating 
capitalization, as it is costly to increase density in the study area.5  
Finally, it is likely that any neighborhood effects of homeownership are tied to 
the particular housing structure in the neighborhood.6 For example, homeowners 
living in single-family houses have a much higher degree of authority on house 
exterior, yard or garden appearance than their counterparts living in multiunit 
apartment buildings. Single-family homeowners may also have more connection to 
neighborhood amenities and the actions of their neighbors so they have more to gain 
from increased neighborhood quality (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). Furthermore, 
homeowners’ incentives may also be tied to housing structure. As Linneman (1985), 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and Glaeser (2011) point out, the major maintenance 
problems in multi-unit buildings are building, not unit specific. This leads to an 
obvious common pool problem as the owners of individual units in a multi-unit 
building have an incentive to free-ride on the expense of other owners in the building 
when it comes to investments into common facilities and building attributes. This 
may apply to neighborhood amenities as well. It is of obvious interest to see whether 
homeowners create externalities in an urban environment consisting mostly of multi-
storey apartment buildings or whether these externalities are confined to single-
                                                 
5 Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2008) find that capitalization of local amenities is 
stronger in areas where housing supply is constrained. Hilber (2010) finds that investment in 
neighborhood social capital is higher among homeowners in built-up neighborhoods.   
6 In fact, Barker and Miller (2009) find that the effect of homeownership on child outcomes varies 
depending on whether the family lives in a single-family home or in a multi-unit structure.  
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family housing neighborhoods. These aspects are of interest because, for instance, in 
Finland over 40 percent of units in multi-storey apartment buildings are owner-
occupied.7  
A caveat in this type of research is that the neighborhood homeownership rate 
is likely to be endogenous in a simple regression model either due to omitted 
variables or simultaneity. We address to this problem by using a semiparametric 
approach with and without instrumental variables. In fact, concentrating the 
analysis on multiunit buildings offers a natural choice for an instrument. The 
arguments by Linneman (1985), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and Glaeser (2011) 
suggest that housing structure, and in particular, the number of housing units in a 
building should drive the homeownership rate of a neighborhood and should be a 
valid instrument. We elaborate on this below.  
We find no evidence of positive externalities from neighborhood 
homeownership rate that capitalize into housing prices in different models we 
estimate. We also test the robustness of these results by relaxing the identification 
assumptions of our instrument using the method proposed by Nevo and Rosen 
(2012). In this method, the instrument is allowed to be correlated with the error 
term of the hedonic regression, while providing a meaningful set identification result. 
Using this method we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the true effect of 
neighborhood homeownership on housing prices is zero. Although these more robust 
results are somewhat imprecise, they are consistent with the fact that the adverse 
efficiency effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing are not offset by 
positive externalities. This means that the tax favored status that homeownership 
enjoys in many countries should be questioned. 
                                                 
7 Homeownership in urban areas and multi-storey buildings is common in other countries as well. For 
example, according statistics reported in Focus on London (2011), homeownership rate in the City 
borough is nearly 60 percent and 36 percent in Westminster. According to U.S. Census Bureau, 
homeownership rate in New York City and Chicago city is 33 and 48, respectively. According to 
Eurostat’s Urban Audit, homeownership rate in Madrid is 78, in Paris 33 and in Rome 64. 
Unfortunately, we have not found data on homeownership rates according to building type. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
institutional background. In section 3 the econometric model is presented. Section 4 
introduces the data and section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2   Institutional Background 
 
We utilize data from the city of Helsinki, which is the capital of Finland. Helsinki 
has a population of almost 600,000 and the city can be thought of as one housing 
and labor market region, although commuting from surrounding cities is easy and 
frequent. Roughly 48 percent of households living in Helsinki are homeowners. This 
is a much lower percentage than the national average of 65 percent. The difference is 
mostly due to a large number of students living in Helsinki and also because single-
family units are more often owner-occupied and single-family units are rare in a 
dense urban area.  
In Finland owner-occupied units in multi-unit buildings are part of 
cooperatives that are incorporated as limited liability companies. This form of 
ownership is considered as home owning just as much as owning a single-family 
house and the same tax benefits accrue to both types of homeowners.8 Membership 
of a cooperative is obtained by buying the shares on the open market, and the shares 
can be traded freely. The shares are treated as private property and can be used as 
collateral on mortgage loans just as single family houses. The company owns all the 
common facilities and usually the lot as well. The executive board consists of 
shareholders and the board is responsible for maintenance and investment decisions 
concerning common facilities.  
                                                 
8 The transaction tax is lower (1.6 percent) when buying housing company shares compared to 
buying a property (4 percent). 
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In some cases, the housing company owns the building but the lot is owned by 
the city of Helsinki, which leases the lot to the company. This is an important 
distinction because neighborhood quality capitalizes into land value and land owners 
benefit from any improvements in neighborhood quality. Thus, if lot rents correctly 
reflect land value households living on rented lots do not have incentives to make 
investments into the neighborhood any more than renter households. However, the 
contracts are long term (up to 60 years), land rents are well below market rents and 
renewed infrequently. This means that neighborhood investments are not reflected in 
lot rents, but are capitalized into housing prices.9 We can control for whether the 
unit is situated at own lot in our econometric models. 
Owning a share does not require the owner to live in the unit in question and 
the owner can freely rent the unit out. In this case, the household living in the unit 
is registered as a renter household. In fact, around half of the privately owned rental 
units in Finland are rented out this way by private individuals. This institutional 
setting creates within building variation in homeownership rates across the city.  
 
3   Data 
 
We use data from two sources. First, we have access to individual transaction price 
data provided to us by the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). The data 
set is based on transactions where major real estate brokerage firms acted as 
intermediary. We concentrate on transactions made in Helsinki in 2006 and 2007. 
This choice is made because we have data on neighborhood characteristics only for a 
single year of 2006. It is plausible that neighborhood characteristics change slowly so 
using transaction data from two years should not be a problem. After dropping 
                                                 
9 In most cases, lot rents are tied to the cost of living index and do not follow local house prices.  
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observations with missing characteristics and insufficient address information for 
geo-coding purposes, the total sample size is 7,472 units.  
The second data source is the Grid Database produced by Statistics Finland, 
which is used to measure neighborhood characteristics (Statistics Finland, 2010). 
The grid size is 250 meters x 250 meters and each grid includes, in addition to grid 
coordinates, information on socio-economic and age structure of the population, 
building characteristics, employment and service levels. The housing units are geo-
coded to the grids.  
Descriptive statistics of the data are reported in Table 1. The housing 
characteristics included in the data are the unit’s floor area, age, condition 
(evaluated for internal purposes by the broker as good, satisfactory or poor), 
maintenance charge (includes heating, maintenance, property taxes, interest on 
company debt etc.), indicator that the building is situated on own or rented lot, 
elevator, floor level and the total number of floors in the building. The data also 
include the address so we are able to measure exact road distances to the central 
business district (CBD), to the nearest commuter rail or subway stop and to sea 
shore using the GIS techniques. Table 1 also includes descriptive statistics of the 
neighborhood variables used in the econometric analysis.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
4   Econometric Model  
4.1   Model Specification 
 
This section discusses our empirical approach. In general, the functional form of the 
hedonic price function is unknown and nonlinear (see e.g. Ekeland et al., 2004). 
Several recent papers have allowed nonlinearities by estimating flexible non- or 
semiparametric hedonic house price models (see e.g. Bajari and Kahn, 2005; 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Dwelling characteristics:
Price (€) 172,585 113,801 60,000 1,500,000
Floor area (m2) 53.7 25.4 11 362
Age (in years) 54.7 22.5 2 136
Condition (broker estimate):
   Good 0.55 0.50 0 1
   Satisfactory 0.39 0.49 0 1
   Poor 0.06 0.23 0 1
Situated at own lot 0.76 0.43 0 1
Elevator 0.32 0.47 0 1
Floor level 3.04 1.65 1 9
Total number of floors in the building 4.92 1.69 2 9
Maintenance charge (€/m2/month) 2.90 0.75 0 8
Road distances (km):
   CBD 5.80 4.49 0.32 19.2
   Nearest train or subway stop 1.25 0.80 0.002 5.83
   Sea 1.23 1.31 0.01 7.28
Neighborhood characteristics (grid):
Homeownership rate 0.49 0.14 0.00 0.98
Household median income (€) 31,756 8,847 13,778 144,092
Share of college educated adults 0.28 0.11 0.02 0.72
Unemployment rate 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.42
Share of pension households 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.81
Share of households with children 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.62
Number of  service jobs per capita 0.44 1.00 0.00 31.02
Number of buildings 21 12 2 67
Population 834 567 22 2374
Mean floor area of units 55.5 13.3 30.3 185.8
Number of units per building 35.4 18.0 1.1 117.8
Note: The data consist of 7,472 dwelling transactions from Helsinki in 2006 and 2007. All 
observations are from multi-storey buildings.
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Redfearn, 2009; McMillen, 2010). However, in this paper we have to control for large 
number of dwelling and neighborhood characteristics (see Table 1), which makes the 
use of a fully nonparametric model infeasible. Moreover, due to endogeneity issues 
with our key explanatory variable (homeownership rate), we will use a fairly simple 
hedonic regression model of the partial linear form. As a starting point, we consider 
a model 
 
(1)  * , ,ij ij j i i ijp amenity f lo la u    x  
 
where pij denotes the log of transaction price of dwelling i in neighborhood (or grid) 
j, xij is a vector of dwelling and neighborhood characteristics, f(loi, lai) is an 
unknown function of longitude and latitude coordinates of the dwelling (loi, lai) and 
uij is the error term. The function f(.) captures unobservable neighborhood 
characteristics that do not vary within the local estimation window as explained 
further below.10  
We assume that homeowners can make investments into neighborhood 
amenities and social capital, which we denote for simplicity with a scalar amenity.11 
More precisely, these are not all neighborhood amenities, but just the ones related to 
the prevalence of homeowners in the neighborhood. The upshot of this strategy is 
that we can remain agnostic of what exactly these amenities are. According to 
hedonic theory, the parameter  can be interpreted as households’ mean marginal 
willingness to pay (MWTP) for a small change in neighborhood amenities (see 
                                                 
10 The model is a variant of partial linear models introduced by Robinson (1988). See Rossi-Hansberg 
et al. (2010) for a recent housing market application of the model. 
11 It is not clear whether neighborhood specific social capital is capitalized into housing prices. 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) assume that it is not because newcomers do not instantaneously gain 
social capital meaning that it cannot capitalize, but Hilber (2010) finds empirical evidence of the 
contrary. Social capital could enhance the ability of neighbors to invest in amenities that require 
efforts from more than one household. However, it could be that some neighborhood investments of 
homeowners’ do not capitalize into housing prices even when they create externalities. 
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Rosen, 1974). Naturally, we expect a positive impact for an amenity, i.e.   0. The 
variables in x and the coordinates (lo, la) are observed by homebuyers and the 
econometrician, but amenity and u are observed only by the homebuyers, which 
means that   is not identified without further assumptions. However, according to 
theory in DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), Hoff and Sen (2005) and Hilber (2010) in 
each neighborhood, the amenity level is a function of the neighborhood’s 
homeownership rate, i.e.  ( ).amenity g ownrate  If homeowners produce positive 
neighborhood externalities we expect that   / 0.amenity ownrate  
If we make the simplifying assumption that  *amenity ownrate  and plug 
this into (1) we get12 
 
 (2)  * , .ij ij j i i ijp ownrate f lo la u    x  
 
Estimating equation (2) (and assuming no endogeneity problems) identifies the 
product ,  not the mean MWTP for neighborhood amenities. However,   is the 
relevant parameter for housing and tax policy purposes because it takes into account 
both the valuation that homebuyers have for neighborhood amenities and, in a 
sense, how productive homeowners are in “producing” these amenities. A sufficient 
test for positive externalities is to test whether   0. It is important to stress that 
in this setup homebuyers value the neighborhood’s amenity level, not 
homeownership rate per se. Moreover, we do not have to assume that homebuyers 
observe the neighborhood’s homeownership rate. They simply need to observe the 
amenity level. 
This argumentation is easily extended to neighborhood disamenities for which 
the MWTP would be negative (  0 ). In this case, if homeowners create positive 
                                                 
12 The parameter  can be interpreted as “the intensity of neighborhood amenity production by 
homeowners” (see also Kling et al., 2007). This linearity assumption is made for simplicity and the 
following arguments do not hinge on the assumption.  
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externalities to neighborhoods (or reduce negative externalities) they should lower 
the disamenity level (  0). Again a sufficient test for positive externalities is to 
test whether   0. Furthermore, a negative sign for   would always indicate 
that homeowners inflict negative neighborhood externalities. This could arise if 
increasing homeownership rate in a neighborhood leads to lower amenity levels (
  0 and 0 ) or to higher disamenity levels (  0 and 0 ). Of course, for a 
full evaluation of the pro-homeownership tax policies, we should also know how 
effective current policies are in encouraging homeownership. This is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
4.2   Instrument Choice 
 
In equation (2) neighborhood homeownership rate is possibly correlated with the 
error term even with a rich set of controls and the partial linear specification with 
dwelling coordinates. This could be either due to sorting according to some 
unobservable neighborhood characteristic that affects prices and attracts 
homeowners or due to simultaneity of prices and homeownership.13 Regardless of the 
reasons for endogeneity an instrumental variable strategy is needed.  
Our instrument choice is based on the fact that there are economies of scale in 
producing housing services that are related to building size in terms of number of 
units per building (see e.g. Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002; Glaeser, 2011). This may arise 
through fixed costs in setting up building maintenance and management. It could 
also be cheaper to arrange the cleaning and maintenance of common facilities or 
tenant selection and monitoring in one building compared to many buildings 
                                                 
13 Since we control for a large number of neighborhood attributes and also include nonparametric 
function of coordinates in our hedonic specification, we expect simultaneity (or reverse causality) to 
be a more serious problem. We discuss the endogeneity problem and its implications further in 
Section 5.  
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dispersed across space. Thus, if there are economies of scale, we should expect 
institutional landlords to own big buildings rather than many small ones for a given 
amount of investment in real estate.14 Furthermore, residents in a multi-unit 
building face a common pool problem because major maintenance problems are 
building, not unit specific (see Linneman, 1985; Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003; and 
Glaeser, 2011). The owners of individual units in a multi-unit building have an 
incentive to free-ride on the expense of other owners in the building when it comes 
to investments into common facilities and building maintenance. This may apply to 
neighborhood amenities as well. Naturally, the common pool problems increase as 
the number of occupants increases. However, these common pool problems are not 
present when a single landlord owns the whole building.  
These arguments suggest that housing structure and the number of housing 
units per building in a neighborhood, in particular, should drive the homeownership 
rate of a neighborhood. More precisely, building size and homeownership rate should 
be negatively correlated.15 This means that the number of units per building in a 
neighborhood is a natural choice for an instrument. The identifying assumption is 
that the number of housing units per building is not correlated with the error term 
in the hedonic regression model.  
In order to make this assumption plausible, we control directly for a number of 
household socioeconomic characteristics along with neighborhood population level 
and total number of buildings. We also control for the floor level of the transacted 
unit and the total number of floors in the building of the transacted unit. Moreover, 
we control for the maintenance charge of the unit which should capture the effects 
that building size may have on maintenance expenses and their effect on transaction 
                                                 
14 A single landlord (a small investor) may also like to own units in the same building due to lower 
monitoring costs because they know the building, the board that make maintenance decisions etc. 
15 Some recent studies also find empirical evidence on this. For example, Hilber (2011) and Lerbs and 
Oberst (2011) report that housing structure and especially building size is an important driver of 
whether a housing unit is owner-occupied. 
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price. In addition, as a robustness check we use the method by Nevo and Rosen 
(2012) that relaxes some of the assumptions of our instrumental variable and still 
produces a meaningful set identification result or bounds for the parameter of 
interest. 
 
4.3   Estimation 
 
The partial linear model can be estimated as follows (Robinson, 1988).16 The first 
step is to use nonparametric regression to regress p and each variable in the 
parametric part (x) individually on the variables in the nonparametric part, in this 
case the coordinates (lo, la). For this step we employ local linear regression with 
nearest-neighbor bandwidths (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988; Li and Racine, 2007). 
Then form the residuals from each of these regressions, say ep and ex1,…, exk.17 The 
second step is to use OLS to run a regression of ep on ex1,…, exk. The coefficients for 
the residuals are consistent estimates of the parameters in the parametric part of the 
model and the standard errors are valid as well. When instrumental variables (say z) 
are used, we simply run the nonparametric regression using the instrument as the 
dependent variable and coordinates on the right hand side and save the residuals 
(say ez). In the second stage, instead of OLS, we run 2SLS using the residuals (ez) as 
an instrument for the residual of the endogenous variable (Li and Stengos, 1996; Li 
and Racine, 2007).  
The model produces a location specific intercept (an estimate of the function 
f(.)), which captures unobservable neighborhood quality that stays constant within 
                                                 
16 See Li and Racine (2007) for a more detailed discussion of partial linear model and its estimation 
using different estimation techniques. 
17 This can be seen as spatial differencing akin to a spatial fixed effect where you subtract the 
weighted mean value of a given observation’s nearest neighbors from each variable of the observation. 
Since only coordinates enter the nonparametric part, proximity is simply geographic distance. The 
mean is basically calculated using inverse distance as weight so that nearer observations get more 
weight.  
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the locally fitted regression or local window. This mitigates both endogeneity and 
spatial autocorrelation problems that may arise due to omitted variables that vary 
at a broader spatial scale than the local window used in the estimation. Thus, the 
intercept term in the partial linear model works in a similar way as a spatial fixed 
effect but with one important difference: in the fixed effects specification it is 
assumed that there is a discontinuous jump at the fixed effect area borders (say zip 
codes) whereas the intercept in the partial linear model varies smoothly over space. 
Another way to illustrate the difference is to consider a housing unit situated just at 
a zip code border. In this case, the fixed effects estimator uses only observations 
within the same zip code in calculating the fixed effects transformation. Obviously, 
using nearby units from both sides of the zip code border can capture unobservable 
neighborhood quality in some cases in a more plausible way. We report results also 
from a zip code fixed effects models for comparison.  
Using a smooth intercept to control for unobservable neighborhood 
characteristics may be problematic when some unobservable characteristics, in fact, 
vary discretely over space. An example would be binding school catchment zone 
boundaries where school quality might change discretely just at the boundary. We 
do not expect this to be a major issue in Helsinki for several reasons. First, the 
school choice system allows the students to attend schools outside of their school 
catchment area. Second, according to PISA tests variance in quality of Finnish 
schools is relatively low (or at least much lower than in most other OECD 
countries). Third, unlike in many countries Finnish pupils are not tested regularly 
using standardized tests and when these tests are carried out the results are not 
made public. The reason is that Finnish education policy makers are concerned that 
publication of test scores and school quality would lead to larger differences among 
schools and segregation based on school quality.  
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A key issue in the estimation process is choosing the bandwidth or the number 
of nearest neighbors used in the nonparametric regressions in the first step. A 
smaller local window (i.e. the number of neighbors) means that the nonparametric 
part can capture neighborhood quality and unobserved factors at a more local level. 
However, in our case the size of the local window or the number of nearest neighbors 
is constrained from below because the neighborhood variables are measured based on 
fixed sized grids. If the local window is too small, in some cases all the observations 
within a local window will be in the same grid and there would be no variation in 
the neighborhood variables making identification impossible. The average number of 
transactions in a grid in our data is about 9. However, the maximum number is 143, 
which is the lower limit for the size of our local window. The average number of 
observations in a zip code is about 106 whereas the maximum is 446. We select the 
number of nearest neighbors so that there will be enough independent variation for 
each neighborhood characteristic. We also experiment with bandwidths of different 
size using 150, 200 and 300 nearest neighbors or transactions. In all specifications, 
we use the second order Gaussian Kernel in the nonparametric step. 
 
5   Results  
5.1   Main Results 
 
Results from our hedonic models are presented in Table 2. Note that we report only 
the results concerning neighborhood homeownership rate in Table 2, while the full 
results from the hedonic models are reported in the Appendix. Homeownership rate 
and other neighborhood characteristics are standardized so that the coefficient 
measures the percentage change in prices as a neighborhood’s homeownership rate 
increases by one standard deviation. As a benchmark we estimated simple OLS 
models with and without zip code fixed effects. The OLS model without zip code 
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fixed effects and controlling for other neighborhood characteristics produces a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for neighborhood homeownership 
rate. At face value, this rather surprising result means that increasing neighborhood 
homeownership rate by one standard deviation (roughly 14 percentage points) 
decreases house values by approximately 6 percent. Including zip code fixed effects 
reduces this effect substantially to 2 percent.  
 
Table 2. Point estimates from hedonic models. 
 
 
The partial linear models with small bandwidths (150, 200 and 300 nearest 
neighbors) produce similar results. In absolute terms, the coefficient is slightly 
smaller or of similar size as in the OLS zip code fixed effects model. As the 
bandwidth size is increased the coefficient on homeownership rate increases in 
absolute terms, although not very much. This might indicate that smaller 
OLS OLS 2SLS
Homeownership rate -0.057** -0.024** -0.071
(0.008) (0.003) (0.048)
Zip code fixed effects no yes yes
F-test for instrument .. .. 19.80
R 2 0.91 0.94 0.94
Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472
nn = 150 nn = 200 nn = 300
Homeownership rate, -0.015** -0.019** -0.022**
not instrumented (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Homeownership rate, -0.024 0.004 0.031
instrumented (0.038) (0.038) (0.041)
F-test for instrument 26.73 25.20 20.25
Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472
Panel A: Linear model
Panel B: Partial linear model
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of transaction price. All models 
include the control variables reported in Table 1 and quarter of sale dummies. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The 
marking nn refers to the number of nearest neighbors or bandwidth size used in the 
local regressions in the partial linear model. ** and * indicate 1 and 5 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
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bandwidths work better in mitigating endogeneity problems or control better for 
unobserved neighborhood variables.  
There are two possible explanations for the negative coefficient. First, the 
result could be the true causal effect so that in of multi-storey buildings 
homeowners’ net effect on neighborhood amenity level and house prices is indeed 
negative (e.g.   0 and 0 ). One possible mechanism is outlined in Linneman 
(1986), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and Glaeser (2011). Multiple owners in a 
building create a common pool problem in investment decisions concerning building 
specific projects and in neighborhoods with high homeownership rates buildings 
could be in worse shape. Second, the result could be explained by reverse causality. 
Households may be reluctant to own expensive homes because it distorts the 
allocation of their wealth portfolio as explained in Henderson and Ioannides (1983), 
Brueckner (1997) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002). For this reason, households 
with a clear preference for homeownership may sort into lower price neighborhoods, 
whereas households with a clear preference for an expensive neighborhood (sea shore 
etc.) may choose to rent and not distort their wealth portfolio too much towards 
housing capital.18 If this is the case the result is due to endogeneity and the effect is 
not the true causal effect of neighborhood homeownership rate on house prices.   
We find the latter explanation more plausible and therefore an IV strategy is 
needed. Using 2SLS with zip code fixed effects again produces a negative effect, but 
the effect is not statistically significant. The first stage F-test statistic is 24.6 
indicating that the instrument has good explanatory power. The partial linear model 
with the smallest bandwidth (150) also produces a negative, but statistically 
insignificant effect. With larger bandwidth (200 and 300) the coefficient is positive, 
but again the coefficient is not statistically significant in either model. The 
                                                 
18 Another potential and related reason for sorting is that user-cost-to-rent ratios can vary across 
neighborhoods and homeownership might be lower in neighborhoods with higher user-cost-to-rent 
ratios due to differences in expected capital gains (see e.g. DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Amior and 
Halket, 2011). 
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instrument works well also with the partial linear model as can be seen from the 
high F-test values. Furthermore, in all cases, the partial correlation of the 
instrument and homeownership rate in the first stage is negative as expected.  
Our preferred results from the partial linear models with instrumental variables 
indicate that neighborhood homeownership rate has no effect on housing prices, and 
thus, there is no evidence of positive externalities.  
This result is contrary to the theoretical predictions by DiPasquale and Glaeser 
(1999) and Hoff and Sen (2005). However, the results could be explained by at least 
two things. First, homeowners’ incentives to invest in neighborhood amenities could 
depend on building type. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) argue that single-family 
homeowners are physically more connected to their immediate neighborhood 
compared to homeowners living in multi-storey buildings. This means that the latter 
group benefits less from neighborhood quality, and thus, has weaker incentives to 
invest in their neighborhood. Common pool problems may weaken the incentives 
further.  
Second, households’ willingness to pay for neighborhood amenities may also 
depend on building type. If this is the case, our results are in line with Autor et al. 
(2011) who studied housing market externalities in the context of rent control 
abolishment in Cambridge Massachusetts. As rent control ended, landlords in 
Massachusetts had more incentives to invest in the quality of their dwellings and 
this could have a spillover price effect on surrounding dwellings. They find strong 
spillover effects, but the effects were much stronger on individual houses compared 
to condominiums. This could be explained by the fact that households living in 
condominiums are less connected to their neighborhood than households living in 
single-family houses. This means that neighborhood quality is less important to 
condominium households and they are not willing to pay as high a price premium on 
neighborhood quality as households living in single-family houses. 
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The theoretical models by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Hoff and Sen 
(2005) do not differentiate homeowners’ incentives according to building type. 
Therefore we cannot claim that our results refute these models. Our results do 
suggest, however, that homeowners’ investment incentives are not strong in multi-
unit buildings and the predictions from DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Hoff and 
Sen (2005) may be confined to homeowners living single-family houses. 
 
5.2   Robustness Check Using Set Identification 
 
The assumption that our instrument is exogenous may not be true. For example, the 
prevalence of large buildings may be associated with unpleasant neighborhoods 
because they block sunlight and view. This could induce correlation between the 
instrument and the error term. In this section, we present results using a set 
identification method developed by Nevo and Rosen (2012) that relaxes this 
assumption and allows for an imperfect instrument.19 To illustrate the method 
consider the following model specification 
 
(3)   * ,p ownrate u  
 
where p  and ownrate  denote the log of transaction price and homeownership rate 
from which we have netted out the effects of the unit’s coordinates (lo, la) and 
control variables (x). Let z denote our instrument. Instead of assuming that 
 ,( , ) 0,z ucorr z u  we need to make assumptions about the signs of correlations 
between the error term, the endogenous regressor and our instrument. More 
specifically, we need to assume that the correlations between the endogenous 
                                                 
19 See Nevo and Rosen (2012) for the formal presentation of linear model and Reinhold and 
Woutersen (2011) for the extension to the partial linear model. 
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regressor and the error term and between the instrument and the error term have 
the same sign implying that   , , 0.z u ownrate u   
We believe that the sign assumptions for the correlations are plausible because 
of the following arguments. First, we assume that the correlation between the 
endogenous regressor and the error term is negative (  , 0ownrate u ) due to 
simultaneity. This is a plausible assumption in our case as explained above. 
Households may be reluctant to own units in expensive neighborhoods because of 
portfolio diversification reasons, and thus, homeowners may sort into neighborhoods 
with lower house prices. Since we cannot necessarily control for this aspect well 
enough in our regressions, we expect the non-zero correlation between the error term 
and the regressor to be negative rather than positive. 
Second, we argue that the correlation between the instrument and the error 
term is also negative (  , 0z u ). For example, if sunlight or prevalence of green areas 
affect prices (i.e. are in the error term of our hedonic regression model) a negative 
correlation arises because neighborhoods with big buildings will have lower levels of 
these amenities. Street crime incidence may also be higher in neighborhoods with tall 
buildings as reported by Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000). This would also induce a 
negative correlation between the instrument and the error term. In addition, we 
know from the first stage of our instrumental variable models presented in Table 2 
that the partial correlation between our instrument and homeownership rate is 
negative. These three assumptions together provide us with both a lower and an 
upper bound for the true parameter value, even when the instrument is not 
exogenous.  
The upper bound can be obtained using the standard IV regression or IV with 
the partial linear model as above. The intuition can be easily seen from the 
probability limit of the standard IV estimator: 
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(4)  
 
       
,
,
plim ,z u uIV
z ownrate ownrate
 
 
where   again denotes the correlation and   denotes the standard deviation. With 
our assumptions, the second term of the probability limit is positive (since 
  , ,, 0z u z ownrate ) and the IV estimator gives the upper bound for the true parameter 
. Similarly, the lower bound can be obtained using OLS because  
 
(5)   

      ,plim ,
u
OLS ownrate u
ownrate
 
 
where   again denotes the standard deviation. Thus, in our case, the above 
assumptions about the signs of the correlations are enough to identify bounds for the 
true parameter value.  
However, Nevo and Rosen (2012) show that tighter bounds can be obtained if 
we are willing to make a further assumption that the correlation between the 
endogenous regressor and the error term is larger than the correlation between the 
instrument and the error term, i.e.   ,, .z uownrate u  This condition implies that while 
we allow  , 0z u , the instrument needs to be “less endogenous” than the endogenous 
regressor. We think that this is a reasonable assumption in our application. Since we 
are controlling for a large number of factors affecting house prices, we expect the 
correlation between the error and the instrument to be quite negligible and at least 
smaller than the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term. 
When this condition is satisfied, one can estimate the lower bound using a generated 
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instrumental variable suggested in Nevo and Rosen (2012). In our case, the 
generated instrumental variable is defined as Nevo Rosen ownrate zz z ownrate      .20  
Naturally, these correlation assumptions cannot be directly tested because one 
never observes the error term. However, the assumptions used here are less strict 
than the usual assumptions needed for a valid instrument, which assume a zero 
correlation between the instrument and the error term.  
We also need to estimate the confidence interval for the identified set. 
Following Reinhold and Woutersen (2011), we use the regular bootstrap to estimate 
confidence intervals for the true parameter value. We sample units with replacement 
and get an estimate for the lower and upper bound for each subsample. We generate 
400 subsamples for each bandwidth size. We then stack all the estimates of the 
upper and lower bound in an ordered vector (with length 800) and calculate the 
2.5% and 97.5% percentiles, which give us the 95% confidence interval.  
The results using the Nevo and Rosen (2012) set identification strategy are 
presented in Table 3. We estimate both a linear model with zip code fixed effects 
and partial linear models with different number of nearest neighbors using the same 
model specifications as in Table 2. The figures in Table 3 correspond to the 2.5% 
and 97.5% percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter estimates. The bounds are 
rather large in all specifications and grow significantly in the partial linear model as 
the bandwidth is increased. However, in each case, zero is in the identified set of the 
true parameter value, and thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero effect. 
Interestingly, all the estimates from the partial linear models reported in Table 2 are 
within the confidence interval. However, the estimates from the partial linear models 
without instrumenting are quite close to the lower boundary of the confidence 
interval. 
 
                                                 
20 Again see Nevo and Rosen (2012) for details.  
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Table 3. Bootstrapped confidence intervals for Nevo-Rosen set estimates. 
 
 
6   Conclusions 
 
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in many western countries. The adverse effects 
of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on economic efficiency and 
income distribution are well documented in the economics literature. Given these 
facts, the main argument in favor of encouraging homeownership has to be that it 
creates positive externalities. If homeowners create positive externalities to their 
neighbors by improving neighborhood quality, neighborhoods with high 
homeownership rates are more desirable for prospective buyers, which should 
translate into higher housing prices. 
In this paper, we tested this hypothesis using semiparametric hedonic 
regression models with and without instrumental variables. Our strategy was to 
estimate a hedonic house price model using data from multi-storey buildings where 
neighborhood homeownership rate is included as an explanatory variable. We found 
no evidence of positive externalities from neighborhood homeownership rate that 
capitalize into housing prices. We also tested the robustness of these results by 
relaxing the identification assumptions of our instrument using the method proposed 
by Nevo and Rosen (2012). In this method, the instrument is allowed to be 
correlated with the error term of the hedonic regression, while providing a 
meaningful set identification result. Using this method, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the true effect of neighborhood homeownership rate on house prices 
Linear model nn = 150 nn = 200 nn = 300
Upper bound 0.003 0.048 0.085 0.125
Lower bound -0.168 -0.072 -0.046 -0.031
Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472
Notes: The table reports 95 percent confidence intervals for the true parameter value. 
The confidence intervals are based on 400 bootstrap repetitions per model.
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is zero. Unfortunately, the bounds for the true effect were estimated with some 
imprecision.  
Our results are in line with the results reported by Barker and Miller (2009) 
and Engelhardt et al. (2010) who find that the beneficial effects of homeownership 
on several outcomes may have been exaggerated in earlier literature. The results also 
suggest that building type may influence residents’ incentives to invest in their 
neighborhood. Explicit consideration of building type should be a fruitful avenue in 
future research concerning various neighborhood effects.  
Our results are also policy relevant as they suggest that the adverse efficiency 
effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing are not offset by positive 
neighborhood externalities. This means that the tax favored status that 
homeownership enjoys in many countries should be scrutinized, at least when a large 
portion of the tax subsidy is directed to owner-occupiers in multi-storey buildings as 
in Finland. Possible reforms include taxing the imputed rental income from owner-
occupied housing the same way as other capital income, reducing the mortgage 
interest deduction or making landlords’ rental income tax free. The last two 
suggestions would not result in a neutral tax system, but could be steps toward a 
more level playing field for homeowners and renters in terms of housing costs.  
Of course the results from this paper concern homeownership in multi-storey 
buildings and may not generalize to other building types. On the other hand, 
because of agency problems related to renting in single-family houses, they are likely 
to be owner-occupied even in the absence of tax subsidies. If this is the case, tax 
subsidies to homeowners in single-family houses are also redundant in the sense that 
they do not increase homeownership. 
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Appendix. Additional regression results. 
 
Table A1. Results from linear models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Dwelling:
   log(floor area) 0.854** 0.013 0.848** 0.005 0.845** 0.005
   log(age) -0.028* 0.013 -0.056** 0.005 -0.050** 0.008
   Good 0.159** 0.009 0.150** 0.006 0.150** 0.006
   Satisfactory 0.067** 0.009 0.066** 0.007 0.066** 0.007
   Own lot 0.081** 0.012 0.034** 0.005 0.033** 0.006
   Elevator 0.000 0.008 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.004
   Floor level 0.016** 0.002 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001
   Number of floors -0.007* 0.003 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012** 0.002
   Maintenance charge -0.010* 0.005 -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003
   Distance CBD -0.026** 0.004 -0.019** 0.005 -0.013* 0.007
   Nearest train or subway stop 0.013* 0.009 0.018** 0.006 0.020** 0.006
   Distance to sea -0.013* 0.008 -0.029** 0.008 -0.019* 0.013
Neighborhood:
   Homeownership rate -0.057** 0.008 -0.024** 0.003 -0.071 0.048
   log(median income) 0.052** 0.015 0.027** 0.007 0.062* 0.035
   Share of college educated 0.080** 0.017 0.042** 0.006 0.063** 0.022
   Unemployment rate -0.010** 0.007 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.007
   Share of pension h'holds 0.007 0.006 0.010** 0.003 0.025 0.015
   Share of h'holds with children -0.052** 0.011 -0.025** 0.005 -0.038** 0.014
   Service jobs per capita 0.015* 0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003
   Number of buildings 0.022** 0.008 0.014** 0.003 0.012** 0.004
   Population 0.011 0.010 -0.025** 0.004 -0.023** 0.004
   Mean floor area of units 0.030** 0.013 0.008 0.006 -0.006 0.016
OLS, no FE OLS, FE 2SLS, FE
Notes: The table reports results from linear models where the dependent variable is the natural log 
of transaction price. All models include quarter of sale dummies. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. ** and * indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table A2. Results from partial linear models where homeownership is not 
instrumented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nn = 300
Variable Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Dwelling:
   log(floor area) 0.843** 0.004 0.844** 0.004 0.846** 0.004
   log(age) -0.056** 0.006 -0.060** 0.006 -0.065** 0.005
   Good 0.153** 0.006 0.153** 0.006 0.152** 0.006
   Satisfactory 0.067** 0.006 0.067** 0.006 0.067** 0.006
   Own lot 0.037** 0.005 0.041** 0.005 0.044** 0.005
   Elevator 0.0005 0.003 -0.0005 0.003 -0.002 0.004
   Floor level 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001
   Number of floors -0.011** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.013** 0.001
   Maintenance charge -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003
   Distance CBD 0.002 0.005 0.0003 0.004 -0.006* 0.003
   Nearest train or subway stop -0.003 0.010 -0.009 0.007 -0.012* 0.005
   Distance to sea -0.047** 0.017 -0.039** 0.012 -0.038** 0.008
Neighborhood:
   Homeownership rate -0.015** 0.003 -0.019** 0.003 -0.022** 0.003
   log(median income) 0.018** 0.006 0.019** 0.006 0.020** 0.006
   Share of college educated 0.024** 0.006 0.038** 0.006 0.048** 0.005
   Unemployment rate -0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.003
   Share of pension h'holds 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006* 0.003
   Share of h'holds with children -0.012** 0.005 -0.014** 0.004 -0.017** 0.004
   Service jobs per capita -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
   Number of buildings 0.011** 0.003 0.013** 0.003 0.015** 0.003
   Population -0.021** 0.004 -0.025** 0.004 -0.025** 0.003
   Mean floor area of units 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.006
Notes: The table reports results from partial linear models where the dependent variable is 
the natural log of transaction price. All models include quarter of sale dummies. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The marking nn refers to the number of nearest 
neighbors or bandwidth size used in the local regressions. ** and * indicate 1 and 5 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
nn = 150 nn = 200
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Table A3. Results from partial linear models where homeownership is 
instrumented. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Dwelling:
   log(floor area) 0.843** 0.004 0.845** 0.004 0.849** 0.005
   log(age) -0.055** 0.008 -0.064** 0.008 -0.074** 0.009
   Good 0.153** 0.006 0.153** 0.006 0.153** 0.007
   Satisfactory 0.067** 0.006 0.067** 0.006 0.066** 0.007
   Own lot 0.037** 0.006 0.042** 0.006 0.048** 0.006
   Elevator 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.004
   Floor level 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001 0.015** 0.001
   Number of floors -0.011** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.013** 0.001
   Maintenance charge -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003 -0.010** 0.003
   Distance CBD 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.011* 0.005
   Nearest train or subway stop -0.002 0.010 -0.013 0.009 -0.021** 0.008
   Distance to sea -0.046* 0.018 -0.041** 0.013 -0.042** 0.009
Neighborhood:
   Homeownership rate -0.024 0.038 0.004 0.038 0.031 0.041
   log(median income) 0.025 0.028 0.002 0.028 -0.019 0.031
   Share of college educated 0.029 0.017 0.028 0.016 0.027 0.017
   Unemployment rate -0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.007
   Share of pension h'holds 0.004 0.012 -0.004 0.012 -0.012 0.014
   Share of h'holds with children -0.016 0.014 -0.0063 0.014 0.000 0.014
   Service jobs per capita -0.001 0.002 -0.0001 0.002 0.003 0.002
   Number of buildings 0.011** 0.003 0.013** 0.003 0.014** 0.003
   Population -0.021** 0.004 -0.025** 0.004 -0.026** 0.004
   Mean floor area of units 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.011
nn = 150 nn = 200 nn = 300
Notes: The table reports results from partial linear models where the dependent variable is 
the natural log of transaction price and homeownership is instrumented. All models include 
quarter of sale dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The marking nn 
refers to the number of nearest neighbors or bandwidth size used in the local regressions. ** 
and * indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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